DAVROS vs. Dr. EVIL

1 December 2006

[I]t is a constant failing of the disarmament lobby to try to ascribe values of reasonableness, tolerance, goodwill and peaceful intent to states under the control of despots, fanatics and dictators.

Thus Julian Lewis lambasts the disarmament lobby.  Only threat of deadly overwhelming retaliation could stop a despot launching a massive attack upon us.

How strong is Lewis’ point?  Hitler, trapped in his Berlin bunker as the Red Army approached, thought the failure of his ambitions indicted the whole of Germany and that the punishment should be destruction.  If he had had nuclear weapons at this point he would have launched them, and welcomed the retaliation: this is incontestable.

So the deterrent doesn’t work against really mad Dictators.  And against the more reasonable Dictator, most interested in screwing over his own population to keep the country’s debt payments flowing (the sort entertained by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s), there’s no need for a deterrence.  What can we say about the middle ground?

The sort of dictator who would be deterred by Trident will be:

– interested in conquest

– seriously thinking about using nuclear weapons

– oblivious to public health risks of his people should they be downwind of the proposed target

– not amenable to rational persuasion that launching the nukes in the first place would not really be cricket

– concerned for his self-preservation (or that of his compatriots).

A 1980s biography of Qaddafi that I read implied that he might be such a person. According to the author of the biog, Qaddafi sent officials around the world to acquire a nuclear weapon without a clear idea of just how serious a weapon it would be, and was rebuffed.  It was claimed, if I remember the book right, that he was thinking of nuking Israel (though it may have been Egypt). 

So perhaps here we have our candidate.  It is a very serious matter to impute such ignorance and such evil intent to another human without hard evidence (Hitler, at least, put his auto-genocidal thoughts on record).  The question is: if Qaddafi had got a bomb, would it only have been the thought of nuclear retaliation that would have stopped him using it.  His diplomatic record throughout the 80s is diabolical, but can (maybe) be read as a rational pursuit of extremely sectoral interests in Libya – and if it is rational, then perhaps rational considerations about retailation would have stopped him using it.

The fact that he didn’t get the Bomb, though, is either testimony to the NPT, which we would be effectively be giving up if we replace Trident; or testimony to the fact that the groups he approached to get the bomb were so convinced of his irrationality that they thought that the thought of nuclear retaliation would not deter him.  If the former, then that tells in favour of losing Trident but and strengthening the NPT; if the latter, then we’ve not yet found a real candidate of someone evil enough to think of using the bomb, but rational enough to be scared off by the consequences.

Which other mad dictators should we consider instead?

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Trident must not be deleted

27 August 2006

The one powerful argument in favour of keeping Trident runs something like this:

Trident deters attacks on the UK which are aimed at destroying the UK entirely; it is worth defending ourself against this possibility: therefore we should keep Trident.

Trident is not meant to deter conventional weapons attacks, because conventional attackers are aware that the UK cannot – for moral, practical and legal reasons – make a nuclear attack in response. (And because the attacker may present no clear target.)

It seems to me that the decision on whether to replace Trident turns on very difficult factual questions about whether such an attack is ever likely to happen, and on weighing the risk against the costs of insuring against it.

But if this is right, then what is the point of a public debate? The call to replace it can only be made by professors of international relations, etc.

Incidentally, this observation makes John Redwood MP’s response to a constituent seem quite even- handed. Redwood says he will study the evidence before coming to a decision; whereas the Conservative Party’s defence policy working group has (like the Labour Party) managed to intuit that the evidence will tell in favour of replacement. Perhaps they are both anticipating an attack by an army of Cybermen.

Incidentally, MEDACT has a useful summary article on the Trident replacement debate.


Deterrence by denial?

14 August 2006

Undoubtedly the thwarted plot to blow up transatlantic airliners is big news. ‘Target Britain’ adorned the front page of The Independent on Sunday (alongside the obligatory image of a rugged, fully-armed, bullet-proofed young man, protecting the homeland). And it went on to devote the first 10 pages (minus advertising space, of course) to the apparent facts, the speculation and the analysis. This was a pattern repeated across the newspapers. I was left in no doubt- the plot was massive, yet MI5 agents and anti-terrorist police had worked together to uncover it and neutralise the threat.

There are myriad ways in which this relates to the discussions on this blog. Isn’t this whole affair just more evidence that the threat we face now (and likely twenty years hence) is not one emanating from nation-states? Doesn’t reporting like this contribute to a climate of fear amidst which legislating for peace becomes impossible? Isn’t money spent bolstering the UK’s intelligence and police services better spent than money to fund Trident’s replacement?

I want to look more closely at this last question. It’s been said previously here that arguing against Trident-replacement on the basis that the money is ‘better spent elsewhere’ is a weak claim, but I think it can be strengthened by relating it to a clarified concept of deterrence. Trident provides Britain with second-strike capability; that is, in the event that – let’s be honest, here – a nation (not a terrorist cell or disgruntled postal-service employee) launches a strike against the UK, there will be uncompromised nuclear weapons somewhere off the coast which will in turn be launched, visiting immense and disproportionate damage on the initial aggressor. The UK’s strategy in holding these nuclear weapons, then, is one of deterrence by punishment. However, deterrence can also be achieved by putting in place systems that make a successful first-strike very unlikely. This is deterrence by denial and the ‘systems’ referred to may be anything from the US’s ‘Son of Star Wars’ missile-defence system, to a highly-evolved intelligence and security programme.

Now, it seems to me that, unless there is a clear state-sponsor, a terrorist attack is unlikely to be deterred by the threat of punishment. Terrorism by its very ill-defined and nebulous nature seems almost immune to this kind of deterrent. Therefore if the most credible threat to the UK is from non-state aggressors (the ‘T’ word is problematic, after all), then the government ought not to put defence money into expensive and inherently provocative strategies (in terms of arms proliferation) for deterrence by punishment, i.e. Trident. Rather, it ought to fund strategies for deterrence by denial, ostentatiously souping up defensive security and intelligence systems.

Which point brings us back to the issue that provoked this post. The media reaction to the foiled attacks of last week seemed an over-reaction to me: an over-reaction whose only effect was to provoke the very fear that *anti*-terrorism measures are meant to prevent. But maybe I missed the point. Maybe the media are acting as part of a broad strategy of deterrence by denial: the audience is the proto-aggressor, and the message is “Don’t even think about it. We’ve got good intelligence, we’ve got top-class security and we’ve got ruggedly handsome policemen- it just won’t work.”

Or maybe I just don’t want to believe that the media are all about attention-grabbing headlines, viewing figures, readership statistics and market share.